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1 This research project for constructing “monetary institutionalism” began in the French-
speaking world. At a session of the opening conference for the project, we attempted to
uncover  the  “unacknowledged  institutionalist  antecedent”  (Baslé  2002),  John  Rogers
Commons (1862-1945) (Dutraive & Théret 2016; Nakahara & Uni 2016). His work on money
is either unknown or known only superficially by modern institutionalists. However, both
his  practice  and  research  work  strongly  concerned  money  (Commons  1934a).  For
instance, he presented the novel idea of the governance system of the Federal Reserve
Board (FRB) to the Committee on Banking and Currency in the House of Representatives
(Commons 1928a). About 260 pages out of the 921 pages of his masterpiece Institutional
Economics were  devoted to  a  discussion of  money as  an  evolving  “social  institution”
(Commons  1934b,  chapter  IX  “Futurity”).  Nevertheless,  a  few  previous  studies  have
compared his theory of money to that of Keynes, and classified it as “Post-Keynesian
Institutionalism” (Atkinson & Oleson, 1998; Tymoigne 2003; Whalen 1993, 2008, p. 232).
Yet the main characteristic of his theory is the “evolutional” perspective for discussing
institutions.  Only Dutraive and Théret (2013,  2017) discussed money as an institution
from the evolutionary perspective.
2 According  to  their  original  dichotomy  of  “political  sovereignty”  and  “monetary
sovereignty,”  Dutraive  and  Théret  (2017)  developed  “two  models”  to  describe  the
evolution of monetary institutions based on Commons’ works. The two models differ in
the  relationship  between  political  and  monetary  sovereignties.  “In  the  first  model,
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monetary sovereignty is owned by private banks and is potentially in competition with
political sovereignty. In the second model, money can be viewed as an agent of political
sovereignty, which shares some similarities with the law as an institution of sovereignty
in the modern state” (Dutraive & Théret 2017, p. 27).
3 This study reveals the evolutionary nature of monetary institutions found in Commons’
works using the groundwork developed by Dutraive and Théret (2017), while at the same
time,  offers  its  critique.  I  revise  their  work  from the  following  three  aspects.  First,
Dutraive  and  Théret  (2017)  used  their  original  terms  “political  and  monetary
sovereignties,” in order to develop the two relationships described above from Commons’
works. I reinterpret the evolution of money as an institution based on Commons’ own
terms and descriptions.  Dutraive and Théret (2017) equated “political sovereignty” to
Commons’ term “sovereignty.” However, is there a term in Commons’ works compatible
with their  term,  “monetary sovereignty?” I  argue that  monetary sovereignty and its
supreme power correspond to “an economic government of bankers” and its “economic
power” as used by Commons (1934b, p. 895). Economic power is defined as “the power of
withholding  property  rights  from  others  as  a  means  of  commanding  obedience”
(Commons 1950, p. 75).  The term I contrast with “economic government” is “political
government” (Commons 1929, 1934b, p. 895). While Dutraive and Théret (2017) derived
their comparison between political and monetary sovereignties from Commons (1934b), I
base my comparison directly on Commons’ (1934b) literature.
4 Second, although they continue presenting the two relationships between political and
monetary sovereignties as two models, I see the “mutual dependence” and “conflict” in
the  two  “principles”  (economic  principle:  “scarcity”  and  ethical  principle:
“reasonableness”)  included  in  the  models  (Commons  1934b,  p. 80,  p. 341;  Dutraive  &
Théret 2017, p. 35), as driving forces of institutional evolution.
5 Third, in the interpretation of institutional evolution, I replace the “advisory committee,”
which  Commons  recommends  as  the  monetary  governance  system.  The  advisory
committee  is  a  collegial  body  consisting  of  representatives  of  organized  economic
interests. Its rules have the same status as laws, which it administers, and disputes are
resolved  under  its  jurisdiction.  Conflicts  of  economic  interests  are  resolved  through
negotiations and compromises in the rule-making processes. Dutraive and Théret (2017)
place this in their “second model,” guided by ethical principles. However, this placement
involves  the  risk  that  the  advisory  committee  is  reduced  to  a  merely  moralistic
proposition. Yet, the dichotomy of political and economic governance is useful when we
think  of  the  significance  of  his  proposition  of  an  advisory  committee.  From  the
perspective of this dichotomy, we will be able to understand that his proposition of a
governance system considers not only the principle of political government but also that
of economic government.
6 Finally, this paper is constructed as follows. In the next section, I define the terms used in
this  paper  that  conform to Commons’  own terms.  In  particular,  the main issues  are
“political government” and “economic government.” In section 2, I show how the
political (federal-level, state-level) and economic governments relate to each other in the
evolution of a political economy. First, I address the relationship between sovereignty
and the pay community in the evolution of a political economy (Section 2.1). Since “a pay
community is the concerted action of creditors and debtors in setting up a procedure for
the release of debts” (Commons 1934b, p. 457); in modern capitalism, it is embodied by
bankers. I present the evolution of a political economy as a process in which sovereignty
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regulates the pay community, seen as a private business practice. Sovereignty regulates
the pay community following ethical principles; that is, a code of public purpose(s). The
public  purposes  presented  in  Commons  (1934b)  are  three  necessary  conditions  for
“reasonableness” of transactions—equal opportunity, fair competition, and equality of
bargaining power.  I  recognize this evolution as the progression towards a reasonable
capitalism. However, Commons (1934b) saw the evolution of political economy from the
point of view of bankers. In other words, Commons (1934b) explained such an evolution
as a process whereby bankers accumulate economic power (this behavioral principle is
“scarcity;” that is,  the economic principle) using the legal foundations of sovereignty
(Section  2.2).  The  discussion  of  this  evolution  in  Commons  (1934b)  implies  that  the
economic  government,  resulting  from  an  alliance  between  the  pay  community  (the
bankers) and industry, will end up controlling the political government (Commons 1934b,
p. 773).  In  section 3,  I  take  the  relationships  of  political  and economic  governments
abstractly  confirmed  in  section 2,  and  identify  them as  the  parallel  relationships  of
“mutual  dependence,”  “conflict,”  and  “politics.”  These  relationships  are  the  driving
forces of institutional evolution. In section 4, I interpret the advisory committee from the
perspective of the dichotomy of political and economic governments. As a result, from
the perspective of the dichotomy of political and economic governments, we understand
that Commons’ proposition concerns both ethical and economic principles. In conclusion,
I stress that his proposition of the governance system of money as institution may be
useful even today.
 
1. Definitions of Sovereignty and Economic
Government
7 In this  section,  I  address  three issues.  First,  I  clarify  Commons’  (1934b)  definition of
“sovereignty” as that of “political sovereignty,” as used by Dutraive and Théret (2017).
Second,  I  search for  terms in Commons (1934b)  that  are compatible  with “monetary
sovereignty” and the sovereign power of money found in Dutraive and Théret (2017). 
8 In Commons (1934b), Commons defines “sovereignty” as follows:
Sovereignty  is  the  extraction  of  violence  from  private  transactions  and  its
monopolization by a concern we call the state. But sovereignty has been looked
upon as an entity as well as a process. As an entity it is personified as The State, and
seems  to  exist  apart  from  the  people.  As  a  process  it  is  the  extraction  of  the
sanction of violence from what had been considered to be a private affair, and the
specialization of that sanction in the hands of a hierarchy of officials guided by
working rules and habitual assumptions. Sovereignty, thus, is the changing process
of  authorizing,  prohibiting,  and  regulating  the  use  of  physical  force  in  human
affairs.
(Commons 1934b, p. 684)
9 Thus, the definition of sovereignty in Commons (1934b) has two aspects. The first aspect
is  the monopoly of  physical  power.1 This  is  the power to define rules (constitutions,
statutes, legal precedents, etc.) and enforce these rules (court decisions, administration,
etc.). In this aspect, sovereignty is seen as an entity; that is, a government. The second
aspect is the monopolization of physical power. This implies that sovereignty is seen as a
dynamism or evolving process of governing the sovereign power, or violence. Commons
described that the government had evolved from “executive sovereignty” to “legislative
sovereignty”  to  the  current  U.S.  form,  “judicial  sovereignty”  (Commons  1934b,
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p. 684-685). In the last form, the U.S. Supreme Court holds the sovereign power because it
is  authorized  to  determine  the  constitutionality  of  legislation  according  to  ethical
principles; that is, the pursuit of “reasonableness.” The elements of reasonableness of
economic transactions are equal opportunity, fair competition, and equality of bargaining
power. The meanings of these words have been changed and will be changed by decisions
of the Supreme Court, which makes decisions pragmatically, according to its precedents
and the changing economic situation (Kitagawa 2017).
10 Money is not related to this definition of sovereignty. Next, I examine the concept of
money as referred to by Dutraive and Théret (2017), and search for a corresponding word
in Commons (1934b). Dutraive and Théret said:
Our  interpretation  is  that,  for  Commons,  money  is  an  institution  that  directly
participates  in  the  development  of  modern  sovereignty.  Thus,  money  can  be
considered a component of government in society, whose power is another form of
sovereignty, as in the case of judiciary power. However, in its contemporary form of
banking and credit relationship, the monetary institution and its working rules can
be influenced by cohesive groups affiliated with the banking and financial system,
possibly in opposition to political sovereignty. (Dutraive & Théret 2017, p. 28)
11 Dutraive and Théret (2017) referred to “sovereignty” as something that holds supremacy,
and is in the position of mediating social relations. The source of the sovereign power of
money is the fact that each individual is subject to two money-based pressures. First,
market participants who disagree with the unit of currency are exposed to pressure to
leave that particular market. Second, market participants who disagree with the rules
regulating the use of money also receive pressure to leave the market.
12 We  can  find  a  term in  Commons  (1934b)  corresponding  with  this  normative  power
described by Dutraive and Théret;  it  is “economic sanction” or “economic power.” In
Chapter IX of Commons (1934b), Commons inquires, in certain communities, what powers
make demand-debts of a bank the instrument that releases debt. His answer is that the
powers are not  only sovereign powers,  to which Knapp’s  “state theory” of  money is
limited, but also “the economic sanctions” of this private pay-community. If a business
person refuses to accept the demand-debt, which is customary tender, the person must be
excluded from the bargaining transactions in the business community, namely the pay-
community. He does not stress a voluntary choice of individuals, but strongly stresses the
collective compulsion of a private community.
It is not only a matter of convenience with him, nor only a voluntary choice of
alternatives, nor only the expectation that he in turn as a debtor can also pay his
own  debts  with  the  same  or  equivalent  bank  checks,  nor  the  expectation  of
redemption in legal tender it is a matter of economic compulsion. It is the economic
sanctions  of  competition,  ending  in  profit  or  loss,  success  or  bankruptcy,  that
enforce  acceptance  of  the  customary  tender  of  bank checks.  So  that  ultimately
nine-tenths of the debt payments in the United States are accomplished, not by
legal tender, but by customary tender.
(Commons 1934b, p. 461-462)
13 Commons (1934b) argued that, due to this economic power (economic sanctions), money
as  used  in  the  modern  banking  system  represents  the  sovereign  position,  which  is
expressed  by  Dutraive  and  Théret  (2017)  with  the  term “monetary  sovereignty.”  As
previously discussed, Commons (1934b, p. 684) perceived sovereignty as the monopoly of
physical power, or “the specialization of that sanction in the hands of a hierarchy of
officials.” With respect to economic power, Commons (1934b) discussed its “entity” and
“process,”  which correspond to  the  entity  that  monopolizes  physical  power  and the
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process  of  specialization  of  that  power,  respectively.  “An  economic  government  of
bankers”  that  de  facto  controls  certain  industries  corresponds  to  the  entity  of
sovereignty, the monopoly of physical power, and, according to Chapter XI of Commons
(1934b), to the process in which “the alliance of banking and industry” specializes and
exerts its economic power (Commons, 1934b, pp. 891, 895; see section 2). The economic
government referred to in Chapter XI of Commons (1934b) is the nexus between the pay
community and “big businesses” (Commons 1934b, p. 888):
It  is  not needful for American capitalism to combine all  competitors in a single
holding company. It is only needful to combine the strongest companies and the
strategic companies. These include the companies that own the natural resources,
the  companies  that  do  the  intermediate  manufacturing  and  transportation,  the
companies that own trade-marks, good-will, and patents which furnish access to
the patronage of customers, and the great bankers who finance the company. This
is  Integrated  Capitalism,  or  Banker  Capitalism,  because  the  integration  can  be
financed only by bankers.
(Commons 1934b, p. 895)
14 “Integrated  capitalism”  is  the  economic  government  of  bankers.  The  economic
government is  compared to sovereignty,  that is,  the “political  government” (see also
Commons 1929, 1950, p. 74). The economic government’s “sanctions are not the physical
force  of  the  state—they  are  more  powerful  sanctions  of  credit,  profit,  and  loss”
(Commons 1934b, p. 895). Hence, Commons (1934b) considered the economic government
superior to the political government.
15 The behavioral principle of the economic government, compared to the ethical principle
of the political government is the economic principle, or “scarcity.” This principle is the
obsession with monopolizing economic power to stabilize the market where the economic
government exists, and to acquire more “expected margins for profit” (Commons 1934b,
p. 580). The expected margin of profit refers to profit margins on sales, or on loans from
the next turnover in the creation, negotiation, and release of debt.2
16 Table 1 displays some terms used by Dutraive and Théret (2017) and the corresponding
terms  in  Commons  (1934b).  Studying  the  use  of  such  terms  in Commons  (1934b),
especially the contrast between sovereignty and the private pay community, or between
political  government  and  economic  government,  we  realize  how  the  dynamics  of
sovereignty and the pay community are discussed in Commons (1934b).
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Table 1. Correspondence between the terms used by Dutraive and Théret (2017) and those in
Commons (1934b)
Source: Compiled by the author
 
2. Political Government and Economic Government
2.1. Sovereignty and the Evolution of the Pay Community
17 In Commons (1934b), “money” is a means of payment (“means of release”) for debts, and
a unit of measurement (“unit of validity,” “unit of value”) for the size of the debt.3 A pay
community follows rules that consist of business customs and laws. Private and public
rules represent the legal foundation for money to be both a means of payment and a unit
of measurement. Commons (1934b) also saw money as a “social institution” (Commons
1934b, p. 513), which means that the debt system itself is supported by these customary
and legal rules.
18 The aforementioned rules have evolved over time. Debt has changed from unnegotiable
to negotiable  debt,  and  from  “unreleasable”  to  “releasable”  debt  (Commons  1934b,
p. 390). The “negotiability” of debt was established by decisions of the court of equity,
which assumed the doctrine of assumpsit from established business customs practiced by
merchants  and  manufacturers  (Chapter  VII  in  Commons,  1924).  The  court’s  decision
guaranteed  the  “incorporeal  property”  created  by  oral  contracts.  The  amount  of
releasable debt expanded through the abolition of slavery, bankruptcy laws, “the gradual
abolition of term or life contracts for labor by substituting contracts ‘at will,’” and “the
prohibition of truck payments and substitution of money payments” in the case of wages
(Commons 1934b, p. 458).
19 It  should  be  noted  that,  in  most  cases  discussed  by  Commons,  the  origin  of  legal
precedents and statutes were business customs. The legal foundations of the private pay
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community descend from two groups of rules: private rules (which are generated and
changed  by  the  pay  community  itself)  and  public  rules  (which are  established  and
amended by  the  political  government,  with  reference to  the  private  rules).  The  pay
community of modern capitalism, having descended from both private and public rules,
is described as a “transactional system of money and value” (Commons 1934b, p. 510).
When money is an institution, a unified “unit of measurement,” the value of debt,  is
created,  negotiated,  and  released.  These  three  steps  represent  a  “turnover.”  Each
turnover is repeated at a certain speed (“velocity” of turnover), which varies over time.
Commons’ (1934b, p. 510) “transactional system of money and value” consists of repeated
commodity transactions and repeated debt transactions.
Our formula of a turnover of bargaining transactions [that consists of two buyers
and two sellers] has not hitherto included the banker. Yet all modern transactions
require the participation of bankers. Even the “cash” payments, usually termed the
“circulation  of  money,  ”  consist  in  drawing  cash  from  the  banks  instead  of
transferring demand debts at the banks. This cash again “flows” into the banks in
payment of debts owed to the banks. The banks themselves, if short on this “money
in  circulation,”  call  upon  the  Reserve  banks  for  “money,”  thus  reducing  their
balances at the Reserve banks. Or, if long on circulation, they return their “cash” to
Reserve banks in order to pay debts to the Reserve bank and thus augment their
Reserve balance.
Hence each of the two buyers and two sellers of a bargaining transaction, who make
the whole of the debt-payments, must have not only an account at his bank, but
also an understanding with the banker as to what he may expect towards obtaining
the  means  of  payment,  which  the  banker  will  himself  create  as  a  deposit  for
carrying out transactions.
Thus our formula for a complete bargaining transaction must have four bankers,
one for each of the two buyers and two sellers in the transaction. (Commons 1934b,
p. 510)
20 Short-term commercial debt is issued as a result of commercial transactions between a
buyer and a seller in a commodity market. A banker accepts the commercial debt at a
discounted value, and at the same time, creates a debt payable on demand in the seller’s
commercial  account of  the bank.  The seller  uses  the created “money,”  and pays the
seller’s own debts for wages and raw material costs.
Thus each loan transaction creates its own money. There is not a fund of money
that “circulates, ” but there is a repetition of the creation, sale, and payment of
short-time debts to the amount equivalent to the discounted values of the titles of
ownership  alienated.  Two  succeeding  increases  in  value  thus  occur,  based  on
forecasts  of  the  prices  of  commodities:  the  increase  in  output  of  use-value  of
commodities to be added by the input of labor; and the increase in value of the
discounted debt as it approaches maturity.
(Commons 1934b, p. 511)
21 In Figure 1, I schematically illustrate a bargaining transaction.4 Commodities represent
one side of the bargaining process, and the other side illustrates the creation of debt.
Bankers, whose customers are buyers and sellers, are responsible for the creation of debt.
Money  (referred  to  as  debt,  in  Commons  1934b)  is  not  introduced  in  the  market
exogenously  from the Federal  Reserve System,  but  endogenously,  through the credit
requirements  of  myriad  bargaining  transactions  in  the  commodity  market.  Credit
requirements reflect a businessperson’s motives for purchases and his/her appetite for
investment. Further, credit requirements often depend on the profit margins of his/her
business. In this way, one’s profit margin is the key piece of information associated with a
businessperson’s decision-making.5
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22 All participants in the bargaining transaction represented in Figure 1 are involved in both
the commodity and debt markets. B and B1 in Figure 1 represent two of the 48 million
buyers in the debt system of Figure 2; S and S1 represent two of the 48 million sellers.
BankerB,  BankerB1,  BankerS,  and BankerS1 represent four of the 9,000 member or non-
member banks. Bankers act concertedly, in accordance with the provisions of the Federal
Reserve System.
 
Figure 1. A bargaining transaction involving nine parties
Source: Compiled by the author, based on Commons (1927, chapter I, sheet 15) and Commons
(1928b, reel 12, sheet 762)
23 How does sovereignty relate to the turnover of bargaining transactions (i.e., the creation,
negotiation, and release of debt)?
Legal  analysis  resolves  negotiation  between  participants  of  a  transaction  into
persuasion or coercion, fair or unfair competition, equal or unequal opportunity,
reasonable or unreasonable price, all of them dominated by scarcity, expectation,
and the customary and legal rules of the time and place. Then if these conditions of
persuasion, fairness, equality and reasonableness are not met, or disregarded, the
court,  representing the collectivity,  reads into the negotiations,  which creates a
debt, determined and measured by the […] dimensions of the value.
(Commons 1934b, p. 524-525)
24 Thus,  if  the  court  observes  inequality,  unfairness,  and  unreasonableness  in  a  loan
transaction, it corrects the situation. In a court decision regarding a loan transaction, the
court compares the loan transaction in question with other “ordinary” and “customary”
loan transactions in similar situations of the same period. The “reasonable” transaction
in the court’s decision means it is considered an “ordinary” and “customary” transaction.
Since  the  meaning  of  “ordinary”  and  “customary”  practices  change  gradually,  the
meaning of “reasonable” practice is also gradually changed by court decisions.
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Figure 2. The Debt Market. Credits and Debits as of June 1929
Source: Commons (1934b, p. 396, Chart 6)
25 Federal  and  state  legislatures  complement the  court  decisions,  being  the  legal
foundations for the turnover of bargaining transactions. I present two examples below.
The first is the “small loan law,” which:
created licensed companies authorized to charge, on sums of $300 or less, a rate of 3
1/2 per cent per month, or 42 per cent year, on unpaid balances, and making illegal
any rates on small loans in excess of that rate. This law was adopted by a number of
states. It was their standard of the reasonable value of the service rendered by loan
companies  to  necessitous  small  borrowers.  Here  it  is  that  organized  society
attempts to offer to the necessitous borrower an alternative, which its spokesmen,
the legislature, deem reasonable.
Yet, on first impression the states were legalizing an usurious rate of interest. But,
considering the only alternatives  previously  available  to  this  class  of  borrowers
who were unable to borrow at commercial banks at the usual legal rates of interest,
a rate of 31/2 per cent per month would have been approximately 32 cents.
(Commons 1934b, p. 335)
26 This is a case of correction of unequal opportunity. The starting point of the court’s (and
Commons’) inquiry is not an ideal market, but a real situation. In an ideal market, there
are possible newcomers who will compete with existing market participants, and if the
rate is high, the newcomer enters the loan market and lends to borrowers at a lower rate.
However, in a real loan market, newcomers are restricted for certain reasons, and the
rate remains high. An individual who has less bargaining power than a corporation is
forced  to  borrow  from  a  banker  at  a  high  rate.  In  this  situation,  the  borrower’s
opportunity is unreasonable. This small loan law – a state law – restrains the bargaining
(economic)  power  of  bankers.  This  law  compares  the  bargaining  power of  a  weak
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borrower  and  a  strong  borrower,  such  as  a  corporation,  and  corrects  the  unequal
bargaining power and unequal opportunity.
27 The second example is  the Federal  Reserve System,  established in 1913.  This  system
integrates thousands of banks, and takes concerted actions with respect to interest rates
and supplied amounts of credit.6 The reasons for the creation of this large system include
the  equalization  of  bankers’  bargaining  power,  and  the  stabilization  of  prices  and
employment.
Manufacturing  industries  next  [to  labor  organizations,  railways,  and  public
utilities]  came within the theory [of  reasonable bargaining power],  the issue,  in
their case, culminating in the [1920 U.S. Steel dissolution] cases […]. Then the most
comprehensive of all industries, the banking industry, was admitted to the process
[of the historical expansion of the theory of reasonable bargaining power], under
the Federal Reserve Act which authorized concerted action of eight thousand banks
[that increase to nine thousand banks in at June 1929], guided by twelve Reserve
banks, in regulating the prices to be charged for, and the volume to be issued of,
bank credit.
(Commons 1934b, p. 345-346)
28 The operations of the Federal Reserve System reflect the concerted actions of myriad
bankers, buyers, and sellers. Commons envisaged the creation of a worldwide system of
concerted actions of central banks deciding their rates; he refers to this system as the
“world  pay  community”  (Commons  1934b,  p. 590).  Inspired  by  Wicksell’s  suggestion
(Wicksell 1898), Commons highlighted the importance of the world pay community, but
he was not optimistic about the actual creation of such an international community:
At this writing, in November 1933, the nations have definitely failed to get together
on  all  questions  of  national  and  international  conflicts  of  interests,  whether
economic, monetary, or military, and the future is unpredictable. (Commons 1934b,
p. 611)
29 In  summary,  Commons  perceived  the  change  driven  by  sovereignty  and  the  pay
community as the process whereby sovereignty provides the legal foundation to create,
negotiate, and release debt to the pay community. This is a process in which sovereignty
regulates the pay community, which was created through business customs, and is in line
with public purposes. We see this evolution as a process toward reasonable capitalism.
 
2.2. Sovereignty and Formation of the Economic Government
30 In  contrast  with  the  process  toward  the  satisfaction  of  public  needs,  in  Chapter  IX,
Commons (1934b) outlined the process where bankers, symbolizing the pay community,
build  an  economic  government  through  a  concentration  of  economic  power.  The
formation  of  the  economic  government  implies  the  alliance  between  bankers  and
industrial  corporations.  Before  discussing  such  alliance,  however,  it  is  necessary  to
address how sovereignty affects corporations.
31 Sovereignty gave a legal foundation to corporations almost in the same way as in the
evolution of the pay community. The key concept is “incorporation.” In the U.S.’s early
days,  only  “those  which  received  special  charters  by  act  of  legislature”  became
corporations (Commons 1934b, p. 881). “In order to get a charter of incorporation the
business men had to align themselves with the politicians” (Commons 1934b, p. 881). At
this stage, those with political power took control, as mediators between political parties
and capitalists. However, “in order to get rid of political corruption,” state legislatures
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introduced  general  corporation  laws,  starting  with  the  state  of  New  York,  in  1848.
Corporations  “established  a  new  right  of  business  men—the  right  of  association”
(Commons 1934b, p. 881).
Then came a new discovery, thirty years ago, the holding company, invented by the
corporation  lawyers  to  evade  the  anti-trust  laws,  and  enacted  first  by  the
legislature of New Jersey. It was not altogether new, for corporations could always
own the stocks and bonds of other corporations. Its novelty consisted in creating
corporations solely or mainly for the purpose of owing and voting the stocks of
other  corporations.  Other  states  competed  with  New  Jersey  for  this  profitable
business.
Almost unlimited powers were granted to the holding companies, and they had all
the privileges in other states which they had in their own state. The only restraint
upon them now became the Supreme Court of the United States. (Commons 1934b,
p. 882)
32 Based on a “per se illegal rule” (any accused, concerted action restricting transactions
was illegal), the Supreme Court introduced antitrust laws. In 1911, the Supreme Court
disbanded two holding companies,  Standard Oil  and American Tobacco.  However,  the
Supreme  Court,  a  judicial  sovereignty,  had  exercised  its  sovereign  power  strictly  to
maintain free competition until the 1910s. In the 1920 U.S. Steel dissolution case, the
Supreme Court applied a new criterion for judgment,  the “rule of  reason.” This rule
assumes  that  public  interests  must  be  weighed  against  the  observed  and  potential
disadvantages of competitive restrictions. As a consequence, restrictions toward holding
companies with considerable economic power were softened. Sovereignty provides legal
foundations for corporations to exercise their economic power, while sanctions against
corporations are enforced only when their actions have a  negative impact  on public
interests.
33 Large corporations were forced to depend on bankers to raise large amounts of capital.
Bankers formed alliances within certain industries, like big manufacturing corporations
at the top of an industry, attempting to control them through funding and dispatching
executives. A symbolic case of “the alliance of banking and industry” was the merger of
Federal Steel (in which J.P. Morgan and E.H. Gary held large proportions of the stock) and
Carnegie Steel, which was held by A. Carnegie (Commons 1934b, p. 890). U.S. Steel was
established  in  1901,  funded  by  big  bankers  purchasing  the  capital  of  big  capitalists
(Chernow  1990).  U.S.  Steel  was  the  first  company  in  American  history  with  capital
exceeding $1 billion. Commons discussed the American capitalism of big bankers and big
manufacturing corporations as follows:
The United States Steel Company, created by a banker syndicate, and sustained by
bankers,  in  some of  its  branches  of  manufacture  controls less  than  half  of  the
nation’s output. But if a small competitor, in the stress of hard times and lack of
orders,  ventures  to  cut  prices  in  order  to  pull  customers  away,  a  mere
announcement  by  head  of  the  [U.S.]  Steel  Company  that  it  intends  to  “meet
competition” brings the unruly competitor back to the prices set by the dominant
corporation.  […]  This  is  American  Capitalism.  It  is  an  economic  government  of
bankers more powerful  than the political  government.  Its  sanctions are not the
physical force of the state—they are the more powerful sanctions of credit, profit,
and loss. The system looks like the old “law” of supply and demand and like the
economists’ principle of marginal utility. Competition still is free, but the sanction
has been changed from the economist’s satisfaction of wants to the business man’s
fear  of  bankruptcy.  The  little  capitalists  […]  become in  America  the  disciplined
followers of Banker Capitalism.
(Commons 1934b, p. 895)
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34 The economic government of bankers, however, means more than the concerted action of
banking syndicates and big manufacturing companies. As pointed out in the quotation
above,  it  also  means  explicit  and  implicit  codes  of  conduct  rooted  in  the  “fear  of
bankruptcy.” Small capitalists are inevitably involved in concerted actions based on these
codes. Thus, the alliance between banking and industry exerts its economic power in a
different way than a monopoly. With respect to the development of the alliance between
banking and industry,  a  perspective  that  stresses  the  formation of  a  great  power  is
different from one that stresses the restraint on the pay community through political
government, to achieve public purposes (discussed in section 2.1).
35 We can see a similar description of the Federal Reserve System. In section 2.1, I discussed
Commons’ view of a system established to achieve equality of bargaining power—a public
purpose. Chapters VIII and IX in Commons (1934b), written in the period between 1927
and  1929  (Commons  1927,  1928b),  reflect  this  view.  In  his  writings  after  1929,  he
emphasized how the political government gradually lost control of the economic
government.
In the public interest and the need to economize the scattered gold reserves in
order to furnish a flexible currency, the Congress unites the bulk of the banks in a
great Federal Reserve System, like similar central banks of the world. The System
makes its own rules and governs its members and borrowers, much like a trade
union. The banking system the world over has become the head of the modern
system of national and international economic government, not only because the
banks  sought  aggrandizement  for  themselves  but  because  dire  public  necessity
required unity of operation in place of the older competitive individualism. Great
industrial corporations are represented on the boards of directors of the twelve
bank boards, and the alliance of banking and industry is complete.
Then the [political] government appoints a Federal Reserve Board to supervise this
stupendous  banker’s  [economic]  government  of  its  own  creation,  but  with  low
salaries and insecurity of tenure in dealing with men of fabulous salaries and the
shrewdest of ability which modern capitalism enlists in establishing its supremacy.
(Commons 1934b, p. 890-891)
When the bankers reach the limit of their ability, as in 1932, then the [political]
government itself organizes a huge reconstruction finance corporation to relieve
the bankers of liability. Meanwhile central banks controlled by bankers rise to a
new  importance  and  Banker  Capitalism  comes  into  control  of  industries  and
nations. (Commons 1934b, p. 773)
36 Bankers had consolidated a significant economic power in their own hands, using not
only industries, but also their physical power—the authority to construct and amend the
legal foundations of the political government, which is founded upon law. In this way, it
is  possible  to  observe  the  consolidation  of  an  economic  power  by  the  economic
government.  This  process,  as  practiced by the economic government,  can be seen in
contrast to the process of monopolization of physical power, as practiced by the political
government (see section 1). Commons (1934b) did not exemplify the lobbying of bankers.
However, he viewed the political government as an entity, as well as the field of politics—
the internal activities of the political government. “Politics” in Commons (1934b) refers
to  the struggles  of  interest  groups  for  power within the government.  As  one of  the
strongest interest groups, bankers are expected to affect the policy-making process.
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3. The Relationships of Two Governments as Driving
Forces of Institutional Evolution
37 In  the  discussion  on  the  origins  and  evolution  of  the  pay  community  in  section 2.1
(Chapters VIII and IX in Commons 1934b),  I  address the process whereby sovereignty
restrains the pay community, in accordance with ethical principles. On the other hand, in
section 2.2 (Chapters X and XI in Commons 1934b), which covers the relationship between
the economic government (the alliance between the pay community and industry) and
the  political  government  (sovereignty),  the  economic  government  seizes  a  great
economic  power  and  starts  to  control  not  only  small  capitalists,  but  the  political
government as well, in accordance with economic principles. Dutraive and Théret (2017)
drew the processes as “two models of the relationship” between political and economic
governments. However, I want to go further by integrating the two parallel processes in
the evolution of capitalistic institutions. This idea is based on the following two points.
First, the two processes were presented in the same book, and were written by the same
author—Commons.  Second,  the  nature  of  Commons’  institutional economics  is  an
“evolutionary” one. Thus, I interpret that the constant change of the institution is driven
by two forces, the political and economic governments.
38 In  section 2,  I  discussed  two  processes.  One  of  these  is  the  process  through  which
sovereignty  coordinates  the  collective  actions  of  thousands  of  bankers,  which  has
enhanced the reasonableness  of  capitalism.  The other  process  indicates  that  bankers
increase their economic power by depending on legal foundations and making inroads in
“politics” within the political government. The theory of institutional evolution brings
the  two  processes  together,  and  identifies  two  moving  forces,  one  towards  ethical
principles and the other towards economic principles (often deviating from the ethical
ones).  Institutional  evolution is  constant  and everlasting,  since the two forces which
relate to both “mutual dependence” and “conflict” are constantly in motion. Thus, I show




39 While the behavioral principles of political and economic governments are different, they
are  in  the  relationship  of  “mutual  dependence.”7 The  dependencies  from  political
government to economic government are, for instance, the following two.
40 First, the political government get practical ideas of institutional reformation from the
economic government. The political government has reformed institutions toward being
“reasonable” by selectively authorizing certain business customs seen as “reasonable” by
the political government—these customs spontaneously come into being in the economy.
Therefore, the ideas of political government are not stored a priori in certain ideal public
purposes  or  ethical  principles  but  are  created  by  the  economy  or  novel  practices  of
economic government. The point is that the political government is not the creator of
institutions, but merely the volitional selector of institutional reformations; the political
government depends on the economic government (or private pay community).
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41 Second, the policy tools of the political government have often been provided by the
economic government. The political government created the system for stabilizing the
debt market—namely, the Federal Reserve System8—by organizing the pay communities
that  had  spontaneously  developed.  The  origin  of  the  financial  policy  device  of  the
political government was constructed by the economic government.
42 In the same manner, the economic government also depends on the legal foundations
provided by the political government. For instance, sovereign securities of incorporeal
properties,  expansion  of  releasable  debt,  and  general  corporation  laws  became  the
foundations for existence of the economic government.
43 Thus, the mutual dependencies of the political and economic governments enable the
political government to reform institutions towards reasonable capitalism, and enable
the economic government to exist and prosper.
 
3.2. Conflict
44 Conflicts happen because the principles of the political and economic governments are
different. Two examples follow. The first is speculation and stabilization. The economic
government is based on economic principles; if its expected profit margin is favorable, it
behaves  speculatively,  using  money  financed  by  banks.  The  speculation  of  this  debt
money results  in rapid shrinkage of  credit,  namely a  crisis.  From the perspective of
stabilization, the political  government has been required to prevent recurrences.  The
extreme case is the regulations of the debt market introduced in the New Deal era. The
banking and securities industries were criticized by politicians and societies, as they were
considered a culprit in the Great Depression. This strong pressure for reform tolerated
even radical experimental policies aimed at overcoming the depression.
45 The  second  example  is  the  conflict  of  the  economic  government’s  pursuit  of
monopolizing  the  market,  and  the  political  government’s  ethical  principles  (equal
opportunity,  fair competition,  and equality of bargaining power).  The decision of the
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in  1911  to  liquidate  one  of  dominant  holding
companies, Standard Oil, is a typical resolution of this conflict. However, the reasoning of
the  court  in  resolving  that  ideal  conflict  has  evolved  gradually,  as  confirmed  in
section 2.2. The operation of the anti-trust law then went into a slump, and in certain
restrictions, “the alliance of banking and industry” was allowed to exist. 
46 When I generalize in the above paragraphs, I can express the relationship of the two
governments as follows. The economic government uses legal foundations, and creates
novel practices for pursuing further profit margins and economic power. If the practices
bring  new  economic  problems,  the  federal  or  state  congress  initiates  a  rulemaking
process  in  some cases.9 In  other  cases,  when the novel  practice  creates  problems in
relation to existing business practices, and a suit regarding the novel practice is brought,
the courts select a practice in line with its ethical principles. Since novel practices are
constantly created, the legislation and selection are endless. The “cat-and-mouse game”
of the economic and political government perpetuates institutional evolution.
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3.3. Politics
47 While  mutual  dependence  and  conflict  are  the  relationships  between  political  and
economic governments, “politics” means “internal activity” within a government. The
principle of politics is “the struggle for powers” (Commons 1934b, p. 761). When we see
politics, we confirm that the principles of one government affect the other.
48 As is well known, the economic government participates in the internal activities of the
political government to acquire further economic power. The typical case is lobbying and
formation of  pressure groups.  Commons (1950)  gives  the example that  the economic
government requires jurisdiction over control of the debt system. Concerning the “lack of
confidence” of capitalists in policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt, “the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, the presidents of the Federal Reserve banks and the Federal
Advisory Council, representing, as they do, banker control of the system, addressed the
Congress  of  the  United  States  in  December  1940,  recommending  the  abdication  by
Congress and the President of control of the credit system and favoring delegation of that
control to this centralized organization of the Reserve banks of the country” (Commons
1950,  p. 255-256).  The  economic  government’s  “aggressive  attitude”  (Commons  1950,
p. 256) thus conflicts with the intentions of the Congress and the president to retain their
authority to stabilize markets.
49 From the standpoint  of  principles,  ethical  principles  sometimes work in the internal
activities of the economic government. Within the collective bargaining system between
an employer and a trade union, the bargaining powers of the employer and the trade
union are equalized. Welfare policies within big companies are established to gain the
loyalty of the employees to the companies. 
50 Although the ethical and economic principles are entangled in the internal activities, the
dominant principle of the activities is “the struggle for power,” or what is called “the
political.” The internal activities, or politics, make the relationship of the political and
economic  governments  a  nested  structure.  In  other  words,  we  can  find  economic
principles  in  the  political  government  and  ethical  principles  in  the  economic
government.  The  regulator  of  the  opposing  principles  is,  in  this  case,  the  political
principle (the struggle for power).
 
4. Advisory Committee: Boundary System of Political
and Economic Governments
51 Whalen  (1993),  after  interpreting  Commons’  money  theory  from  the  Post-Keynesian
perspective, discussed the advisory committee that Commons (1928a, 1950) presented as
one of the “policy implications” of his money theory (Whalen 1993, p. 1165). However,
that is not enough to help readers understand the significance of the advisory committee
in the evolution of monetary institutions. Dutraive and Théret (2017, p. 42), referring to
the  description  of  Whalen  (1993),  placed  the  advisory  committee  in  the  model  of
“reasonable capitalism.” However, this placement has a risk. Reader will see the advisory
committee as merely a moralistic proposition by Commons. This study interprets the
advisory  committee  as  placed  in  the  boundary  area  of  the  political  and  economic
governments, and then shows that his proposition concerns both ethical and economic
principles.
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4.1. Developing the Boundary Area
52 As  we  saw  in  section 3.3.,  in  1940,  the  economic  government  required  the  political
government to transfer further authority over control of the debt system and deregulate
it. The issue is, like the dichotomy we have used, whether the political or the economic
government should administer the debt system.
53 In this conflicting context, Commons (1950, p. 254-257) proposed the advisory committee.
It is a collegial body that consists of representatives of organized economic interests. In
addition  to  the  bankers’  association  representatives,  manufacturers’  associations,
farmers’ organizations, and trade unions select and send their own representatives to the
committee.  In this  proposed advisory committee,  the interests  are broader than just
those  of  the  bankers  and  big  capitalists,  whose  interests  dominate  the  economic
government; each interest is given “equal bargaining power.” The interests involved are
those  being  influenced  by  the  policies  of  the  FRB.  The  committee  makes  a
“recommendation” to the FRB regarding its rules and its ways of executing those rules,
developed through negotiations and compromise of the interests of the committee. In
light  of  his  description  of  other  advisory  committees  (of  the  Wisconsin  Industrial
Commission) seen in his other work (Commons 1934b, p. 848), the FRB is to comply with
the recommendation and “order” or perform it. A part of sovereign power—that is, the
authority for making rules and executing them within a certain jurisdiction—is handed to
the FRB, with the involvement of the committee given strong authority. Thus, the this
involvement is interpreted as the governance system of the debt market, placed in the
boundary  area  between  the  political  and  economic  governments  (see  Figure 3).  The
governance system proposed by Commons is interpreted as a boundary system in the gap
between political and economic governments.
 
Figure 3. The advisory committee as the boundary system between political and economic
governments
Source: Compiled by the author
 
4.2. The Proposition Considering Ethical and Economic Principles
54 When  he  proposed  the  advisory  committee,  Commons  considered  both  ethical  and
economic principles. First, I analyze his proposition from the perspective of the political
government  and  ethical  principles.  The  merit  of  the  proposition  for  the  political
government  is  to  prevent  dysfunction  brought  by  the  concentration  on  resolving
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frequent conflicts. Under the proposition, the economic interests directly negotiate their
own economic conflicts and reach a compromise in the committee. From the perspective
of  the  ethical  principles,  I  can  point  to  the  following  two.  First,  in  the  system,  the
bargaining powers of interest groups are intentionally equalized. Second, rules made by
negotiation and compromise of the parties concerned have the potential to become better
rules than those constructed by the political government.  As noted above,  when the
political  government  makes  its  rules,  its  targeted  level  is  a  tradition  of  “ordinary”
(Commons 1934b, p. 860). Ordinary has the same meaning as “reasonable” in the courts.
However, the negotiation between interest groups has the possibility of constructing a
rule that brings others up, as near as possible, to level of “best practicable” (Commons
1934b, p. 860-861). This is another meaning of “reasonable,” constructed by the boundary
system. The committee has the ability to diffuse higher levels of reasonable practices over
its jurisdiction than do the courts.
55 Next, I analyze his proposition from the perspective of the economic government and
economic  principles.  According  to  Commons  (1950,  p. 254-255),  the  expected  profit
margin involves a degree of “political confidence”; that is, one’s expectation as to what
degree the future policies of the political government are favorable for him/her. From
the perspective of  political  confidence,  the administration of  the debt market by the
political government brings a “lack of confidence” of bankers and big businesses. The lack
of confidence means a reduction in the expected profit margin, which reduces industries’
borrowings; that is, it reduces credit creation. On the other hand, the administration of
the debt market by the economic government may excessively increase the expected
profit  margin,  causing  industries  to  excessively  borrow  funds,  and  speculate.  As  a
consequence, credit creation increases and prices of commodities and securities rise, and
the economic situation ends in a “collapse” (Commons 1950, p. 255). For the economic
government,  the  advisory  committee  is  evidently  not  favorable  compared  to  their
monopolized administration of the debt market.  Yet on a long-term basis,  this is not
necessarily true. If we remember the experience of the Great Depression, where intense
competition between bankers resulted in them facing catastrophic effects through the
collapse of credit, the advisory committee is not necessarily an unfavorable system for
them on a long-term basis.
56 Thus, Commons’ proposition considered both the political and economic governments. If
the  governance  system  is  adopted,  then  the  degree  of  political  confidence  in  the
economic government is not as good, but not “lacking.” While Commons himself did not
say  it  clearly,  this  middle  circumstance  of  political  confidence  is  probably  a  good
condition for the purpose of stabilizing money as a debt system.
 
Conclusion
57 If  modern  institutionalists  start  to  construct  “monetary  institutionalism,”  they  (we)
should  give  some  time  and  effort  to  excavating  the  materials  of  unacknowledged
antecedents.  With  this  motivation,  this  study  examines  the  evolutionary  monetary
institution  theory  of  J.R. Commons,  and  reconstructs  it  from  his  own  contradictory
concepts of political government (sovereignty) and economic government (private pay
community).
Political Government and Economic Government in J.R. Commons’ Institutional E...
Économie et institutions, 26 | 2017
17
58 In the process of  the reconstruction,  we have learned that he drew in detail  the co-
evolution of sovereignty and the pay community, and we can see the two processes of the
co-evolution. One is the process where the political government has imposed regulations
on the pay community based on ethical principles. The other is the process where the
economic  government,  part  of  whose  foundations  are  the  laws  of  the  political
government, have endeavored to direct the political government toward the goal of its
economic principles. These processes are similar to the two models shown by Dutraive
and Théret  (2017).  However,  this  study went  further  by  integrating the  two parallel
processes  in  the  evolution  of  capitalistic  institutions.  My  interpretation  is  that  the
heterogeneity of the governments or principles are two driving forces of constant change
in  the  institutions  and  their  simultaneous  relationships  of  “mutual  dependence,”
“conflict,” and “politics.”
59 From the perspective of two governments, I then confirm that Commons made a novel
recommendation, suggesting that this recommended system go beyond the dichotomy of
two  governments.  This  recommendation  is  not  a  romantic  ideal  because  he  was
concerned with both economic and ethical principles.
60 Nearly 80 years after the 1929 Great Depression, we experienced a world financial crisis,
which was the emergence and collapse of securitized debts. Though the world economy
seems to have recovered superficially,  the great challenge of how we reconstruct the
governance system to stabilize the debt market remains up in the air. Should we leave the
role  of  the  administrator  to  the  political  government  or  the  economic  government?
Commons proposed an alternative—breaking away from the dead end of the dichotomy.
His proposition—the advisory committee—is a boundary system in a gap between the
political and economic governments. It may be a useful idea when we think about a novel
governance system for money.
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NOTES
1. This aspect is the same as M. Weber’s famous definition of state (Weber 1919). However, the
second aspect, sovereignty as a process, may be the interesting point of Commons’ discussion. As
a process, as shown in Commons (1924, 1934b, 1965), sovereignty co-evolves with the economy.
This perspective of sovereignty is the uniqueness of Commons’ perspective, and Dutraive and
Théret (2017), therefore, stressed this perspective.
In  regard  to  physical  force  or  violence,  the  concept  of  sovereignty  is  connected  with  the
monopolization of violence. The only authority administering violence is the state. However, this
does not mean the state—in this paper, the political government—does not use economic and
cultural powers. In reality, as Commons (1950, p. 77, p. 214) briefly said, the political government
also  uses  economic  and  cultural  sanctions,  and  sometimes  a  sanction  is  the  combination  of
violence and the other two powers.
2. In Commons (1934b, p. 512-513), unlike in the quantity theory of money, PT (P: prices of trade,
T: volume of trade) is decided by not MV (M: quantity of money, V: velocity of money), but by the
expectation of obtaining a profit  margin. This expectation drives business persons to borrow
from  banks.  This  borrowing  before  profit  is  realized  creates  effective  demand.  Therefore,
customary and legal controls of these expectations is an important issue for Commons (1934b).
As discussed in section 4, the expectations contain political confidence. It is one of the reasons
that Commons presented his novel governance institution for the debt system.
3. The unit of validity correlates the transaction of goods with creation of debt. Under a certain
unit  of  validity,  a  price in a commodity market decides the size of  debt created in the debt
market.  In  other words,  the unit  of  validity  correlates  the commodity market  with the debt
market.
4. As  shown in Commons (1934b,  p. 242),  sovereignty is  the underlying “fifth party” of  each
bargaining transaction.
5. According  to  Commons  (1934b,  p. 560-590),  large  swings  in  corporations’  narrow  profit
margins cause instability in modern capitalism.
6. The approach of the Federal Reserve Board is to control the discount rate, and the reserve
ratio (Commons 1934b, p. 610).
7. Commons (1934b, p. 6) expressed the three circumstances of transactions: “conflict,” “mutual
dependence,”  and  “order.”  I  interpret  the  first  two  concepts  as  expressing  the  parallel
relationships between political and economic governments. The other term I use in section 3.3.,
“politics,” is, according to Commons, the process of negotiation and compromise of participants
in a transaction to get further power. The compromise, a result of politics, is the circumstance of
“order,”  the  third  concept,  which  means  that  the  behaviors  of  participants  involved  in  the
compromise become institutionalized.
8. The Federal  Reserve System is  nonetheless  not  completely  the policy  tool  of  the political
government. It is the amalgam of political and economic governments.
9. The congress and executive branches are organizations that do not merely behave based on
ethical principles. There are also arenas of “politics,” mentioned below, based on the principle of
the “struggle  for  power” (Commons 1934b,  p. 761).  Yet,  if  their  laws and administration run
counter to the ethical principles of that time and place, in the end, the Supreme Court will deem
them unconstitutional. In this way, the Congress and executives are also (in an indirect way)
based  on  strong  ethical  principles.  Therefore,  in  the  United  States’  system  of  “judicial
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sovereignty,”  it  may be  said  that  the  political  government is ultimately  subjected to  ethical
principles.
ABSTRACTS
This article clarifies the evolutional theory of money as an institution presented by the American
institutionalist  J.R. Commons,  from  the  perspective  (dichotomy)  of  the  political  government
(“sovereignty”) and the economic government (the alliance between the pay community and
industry). This article identifies two interactive processes between the political and economic
governments, and integrate them to present a constant evolution driven by mutual dependence,
conflict,  and the politics of these governments. Finally, it  places Commons’ proposition of an
“advisory committee,” a novel governance system of the debt market, as a boundary system in
the gap between the governments.
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